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Notes and Comments
Ian A. Hunter*

Conscientious Objection and
Canadian Citizenship

Can a conscientious objector become a Canadian citizen? One might
be forgiven for supposing that the answer was, self-evidently, Yes.
Mr. and Mrs. Thorburn Jensen discovered, to their chagrin, that the
courts took a different view. 1
Before examining the Jensen case in detail, it may be useful to
review the treatment of conscientious objectors in Canada,
particularly in wartime.
Conscientious objection is not a recent phenomenon in Canada.
In 1873, twelve Russian Mennonites journeyed to Canada to review
the possibility of widespread immigration, and, specifically, to
discuss the status of conscientious objection with government
officials. 2 After extensive negotiation, they received a letter from
Mr. John Lowe, Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, promising
an entire exemption from military service ...
to
Mennonites". 3 On August 13th, 1873 this promise was confirmed
by order in council. A decade later, the first Militia Act exempted
from military service "Any person bearing a certificate from the
Society of Quakers, Mennonites or Tunkers, or any inhabitant of
Canada, of any religious denomination, otherwise subject to
military duty, but who, from the doctrines of his religion, is averse
to bearing arms and refuses personal military service . . .,,.4 In
1898 Doukhabors were specifically granted military exemption 5 ,
and the following year an order in council granted Hutterites "...
the fullest assurance of absolute immunity from military service, not
only to those who have already settled, but also to those who may
*Ian A. Hunter, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Western
Ontario.
1. Re Jensen (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3D) 514
2. The history of this arduous expedition and further detail on the negotiations may
be found in E.K. Francis, In Search of Utopia: The Mennonites in Manitoba
(Altona: D. W. Friesen and Son, 1955) c. 2
3. The letter is reproduced in full in Francis, Id. at 44-5.
4. S.C. (1883) 46 Vict. c.11,s.15
5. Woodcock and Avakumovic, The Doukhabors (Ottawa: McClelland and
Stewart, Carleton Library series, 1977) at 137
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settle in the future." 6
But what was expedient to grant in peacetime, when federal
policy actively sought settlers for an expanding West, became
difficult to maintain in the face of wartime resentment from
Canadians whose husbands, sons and relatives were dying in
defence of their country. The Dominion Elections Act of 1916
disenfranchised all conscientious objectors. 7 Although exemptions
continued to be granted throughout the first world war to those who
could prove membership in an historic "peace" church, individual
objectors incurred public obloquy and scorn as "slackers". On
occasion, Mennonite churches were desecrated .13
By 1918 public
resentment of conscientious objectors was sufficiently inflamed that
the 'Honourable J.A. Calder, Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration, promised a law: ".

.

. that no man shall be allowed to

come to this country unless he is prepared to carry his full share of
the military burden". 9 On May 1st and June 9th, 1919, the
government of Canada ".

.

. owing to the results of the war..."

passed orders in council forbidding further immigration to Canada
of Doukhabors, Hutterites and Mennonites (who, in common, hold
conscientious objection as a principal religious tenet) because of
their unwillingness ".

.

. to assume the duties and responsibilities

of Canadian citizenship". ' 0 By 1921, wartime passions had abated,
and this restrictive order in council was quietly rescinded. 1 '
So far as it is possible to discover, no denials of citizenship
because of conscientious objection occurred before, during or after
6. P.C. 1676, August 12, 1899. This order in council was rescinded on April 8,
1919.
7. R.S.C. 1916, c.6, s.67
8. "When the soldiers returned, groups of veterans forced themselves into the
Rosthern Mennonite Church, cursed, and hurled the pulpit Bible between the
benches. An attempt was made to bring a cow into the church ...A black flag was
hung from the church steeple."
H. Frank Epp, Mennonite Exodus (Altona: D. W. Friesen and Son, 1962) at 98-9
9.id. at 99
10. The order in council also cited their"... peculiar customs, habits, modes of
living, and methods of holding property"; P.C. 923 (May 1, 1919) and P.C. 1204
(June 9, 1919).
11. The Honourable J.A. Calder, Minster of Citizenship and Immigration, who
was instrumental in the enactment of the restrictive regulation was also
instrumental in its repeal On October 14, 1921 he wrote to a Mennonite minister:
"I have thought about this matter ... and I am sure that the regulations of the
immigration law forbidding certain classes of conscientious objectors will be
removed during the war. I personally have no doubt that they will be dropped
again."
Quoted in Epp, supra, note 8 at 103
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the first world war. This may be because most conscientious
objectors were Mennonites who refused combatant status but were,
in most cases, willing contributors either financially, or by
12
alternative service, to a victorious outcome.
On December 10, 1939 Canada declared war on Germany and,
on June 21, 1940 Royal assent was given to the National Resources
Mobilization Act. The regulations made thereunder authorized
compulsory military service but included an absolute exemption for
Mennonites and Doukhabors (unlike previous legislation Quakers,
Tunkers and Hutterites were not mentioned), and a qualified
"postponement ... until further notice" for conscientious
objectors of other religious denominations. 13
Alternative service for conscientious objectors took three
particular forms: first, work camps in National Parks or at Forest
Experimental Stations; second, service in agriculture or designated
essential industries; or, third, service with the Royal Canadian
Army Medical Corps or the Canadian Dental Corps. Compulsory
deductions (ranging from $25 to $60 monthly) were made from
salaries paid to those in alternative service; money so collected was
sent to the Red Cross. The total number of Canadian conscientious
objectors in the second world war was approximately 10,800 of
whom 7,500 were Mennonites. 14
Jehovah's Witnesses did not fare as well. On July 4, 1940 they
were declared to be "an illegal organization" under the Defence of
Canada regulations. 15 Mere membership in the sect was an offence.
This draconian measure appears to have been prompted less by their
conscientious objection than by their proselytizing inroads,
particularly among Roman Catholics in Quebec, and by their
allegedly seditious literature. 16 Charles Morrell, then Secretary to
Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff, reported that between July and
December 1940, twenty-nine Jehovah's Witnesses were prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to a cumulative total of 300 months
12. Some Mennonites initially objected to buying Victory Bonds or contributing to
the Red Cross. But when they received assurances that their donations would be
used for charitable purposes, most gave generously. It is estimated that Mennonites
contributed more than 700,000 dollars to Victory Bonds (on which many refused to
accept interest) and, in 1918 alone, more than 100,000 dollars to the Red Cross.
Francis, supra, note 2 at 188
13. P.C. 10924, December 1, 1942
14. 1 have drawn the information in this paragraph from Epp, supra, note 8 at
328-331.
15. Defence of Canada Regulations, Canada Gazette, vol. 74 (1941), s.39(c)
16. Cf. Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265
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in prison, either for membership or possessing witnesses'
literature. 17 In 1943, acting upon the recommendation of a
parliamentary committee, the government deleted Jehovah's
Witnesses from the Defence of Canada Regulations subversive
list.18 Again one finds no recorded denials of citizenship to
conscientious objectors during, or immediately after, the second
world war.
The Canadian CitizenshipAct requires an applicant to personally
appear before the Citizenship Court for examination and to produce
such evidence as the Court may require as to his fitness for
citizenship.' 9 Section 10 enumerates criteria, some objective 20 ,
others subjective 21 , on which the Court must be satisfied. Section
10(1) (f) requires the applicant to satisfy the Court "that he has an
adequate knowledge of the responsibilities and privileges of
Canadian citizenship and intends to comply with the Oath of
Allegiance. . .". The Oath of Allegiance states:
I, A.B., swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, her Heirs and Successors,
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of
Canada and fulfil my duties as a Canadian citizen.
22
So help me God.
In 1968 four Jehovah's Witness applicants from Yale County,
British Columbia were refused citizenship because the Citizenship
Court held conscientious objection to be incompatible with the
"responsibilities and privileges of Canadian citizenship". They
23
appealed.
Kerr J. (of the Exchequer Court) sitting as a Judge of the
Citizenship Appeal Court carefully reviewed the leading American
decisions 24 culminating in the 1946 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Girouardv. U.S., holding that conscientious objection is
17. M. James Penton, For God, Church and Freedom: The Struggle of Jehovah's
Witness for Religious Freedom in Canada, (publication pending), Manuscript, p.
145
18. P.C. 8002, October 14, 1943
19. R.S.C. 1970, c.C-19, s.26
20. For example, age (21), residency (Canadian residency for at least 12 of the 18
months immediately preceding application), lawful admission to Canada, etc.
21. For example, "good character" and "adequate knowledge" of French or
English
22. CanadianCitizenshipAct, supra, note 19 Schedule II
23. ReAhnaasetal, [1969]2Ex. C.R. 391
24. U.S. v. Schwihnmer (1928), 279 U.S. 644; U.S. v. Macintosh (1930), 283
U.S. 605; U.S. v. Bland (1930), 283. U.S. 636
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not a bar to citizenship. 2 5 In concurring with this view, Kerr, J.
pointed out that neither the Citizenship Act nor the Oath of
Allegiance expressly, or by necessary implication, require military
service. He alluded to the fact that military service in Canada has
traditionally been on a voluntary basis, and conscription has been
invariably regarded as a distasteful measure of last resort. He
concluded:
It is beyond dispute that persons who refuse to serve in the
Armed Forces because of religious beliefs may still serve Canada
well in other ways in peace and in war. They can be good
citizens, 6 notwithstanding their refusal to serve in the Armed
Forces. 2
Since the Citizenship Appeal Court may be a final appellate
court 27 , one might reasonably have concluded that the issue had
been conclusively resolved, at least in respect "of Jehovah's
Witnesses. Not so.
Thorburn and Bente Jensen immigrated to Canada in 1955. In
their two decades in Canada prior to their citizenship application,
they had lived in British Columbia and Ontario. Both were gainfully
employed. Neither had a criminal record. Since they subsequently
became my clients, it might be thought indecorous, or at least
partial, for me to describe their integrity and personal character; this
is Addy J.'s assessment:
Both appellants impressed me as being good, honest people
with a deep religious faith which they translated into action in
their daily lives. They are members of the movement known as
Jehovah's Witnesses, the husband being an ordained minister of
that faith. He fulfils his duties as a minister without remuneration
of any kind. He is a painter by trade and has apparently made a
financial success of it. Both he and his wife are apparently strong
believers in the work ethic and have never taken advantage of the
social benefits provided for in our society. They are both
interested in helping their fellow man and in preserving family
25. (1945), 328 U.S. 61 at 64 (per Douglas J.)
"Refusal to bear arms is not necessarily a sign of disloyalty or a lack of
attachment to our institutions. One may serve his country faithfully and devotedly
though his religious scruples make it impossible for him to shoulder a rifle.
Devotion to one's country can be as real and as enduring among non-combatants as
among combatants."
26. Re Alnaas, supra, note 23 at 399
27. CanadianCitizenshipAct, supra, note 19 at s. 31 (5):
"Upon the hearing of an appeal brought pursuant to this section, the Citizenship
Appeal Court may confirm or reverse the decision of the court appealed from and a
decision confirming a decision of the court appealed from is final and conclusive."
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ties and the sanctity of marriage and they are so motivated by
reason of their faith. It was amply demonstrated how they, with
some degree of success, constantly seek to rehabilitate alcoholics
and other persons who, in their view, have strayed from the path
of righteousness. Their children are exceptionally clean-cut and
alert and the family from all appearances is a model one. 28
The Jensens' first application for citizenship came on before His
Honour Judge Lane in Prince Edward County on August 17, 1973.
At all stages, Mr. and Mrs. Jensen clearly indicated that they were
prepared to swear the Oath of Allegiance.
Presumably to satisfy himself on the Jensens' knowledge of the
"responsibilities and privileges of Canadian citizenship" Judge
Lane embarked on a series of questions about military service. Not
only were the questions hypothetical, they required responses
without foreknowledge of the contingencies which might again lead
Canada into war. To all these hypothetical questions the Jensens
replied that they would refuse, on religious grounds, to actively or
passively assist in war. Judge Lane pronounced himself "disturbed" by their answers, and reserved his decision, taking the
rather questionable step of "referring the matter back to the
Department". 29 The transcript does not disclose what, if anything,
the Department said or did.
On October 16, 1973 Judge Lane gave written reasons denying
citizenship. "Except for their prejudice which arises by virtue of
their religion, Jehovah's Witness" Judge Lane wrote, he was
satisfied that ".

.

. they would be satisfactory citizens and had

complied with the requirements of the various sections of the
Act." 30 Insofar as one can extract a ratio (a difficult task from such
skimpy, muddled reasons) it appears to be this: "These applicants
should not be granted citizenship unless they are prepared to take on
some responsibilities of that citizenship". 31 In the very next line,
Judge Lane characterizes the Jensens' conscientious objection as
". .. a refusal to take on any responsibilities of citizenship". But
whether he meant "some" or "any" responsibilities, his statement
is clearly contradicted by the evidence before him. That evidence
established that the Jensens accept and, in an exemplary manner,
28. Re Jensen, supra, note 1 at 515
29. In Re Thorburn Jensen, Transcript of Reasons for decision of His Honour
Judge Lane, unreported, October 16, 1973, p. 1
30. Id.
31. Id. at3
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discharge all the responsibilities of citizenship except military
service; the necessary implication is that Judge Lane held that active
military service, or at least a declared willingness to engage in
non-combatant service (e.g. as a stretcher bearer) is a prerequisite to
a grant of Canadian citizenship.
The Citizenship Act provides an appeal to a Citizenship Appeal
Court and its decision, if confirming the Court of first instance, is
". . final and conclusive" .32 On April 8, 1976 Addy J., sitting as
a Citizenship Appeal Court Judge, confirmed a denial of citizenship
to the Jensens.
At the appellate hearing, Mr. Jensen was again subjected to
extensive hypothetical questions. 33 As there was no nominal
respondent (no one, at any stage, opposed the Jensens' application
for citizenship) Addy J. appointed Mr. Frederick Chenoweth as
anicus curiae. In a written memorandum to the Court, after the
hearing, Mr. Chenoweth criticized this hypothetical questioning as
"unduly speculative" and "inappropriate" and concluded:
I submit that in light of the clear demonstration of the very
desirable nature of this applicant and in light of his past and
proposed contribution to the community that such speculation
without clear breach of the requirements of the
Citizenship Act
cannot be grounds for denying this application. 34
Nevertheless, Addy J. upheld the denial of citizenship. He
purported to distinguish Kerr J.'s prior decision in Re Ahnaas as
limited to conscientious objection to active military service, and not
extending to a refusal, like the Jensens', of non-combatant
service. 35 With respect, this is unconvincing. All appellants in Re
Ahnaas were Jehovah's Witnesses (in fact, acquaintances of the
Jensens) whose beliefs were, in all respects, identical to theirs.
32. Supra, note 27
33. Some of the questions seem quaint in this age of nuclear and neutron
weaponry: e.g.
"He would refuse, for instance, in his capacity as a painter to paint a cannon. He
stated, however, that he would not refuse to paint the windows of any factory
manufacturing cannons as he believed that this might be sufficiently remote from
the war effort. .. ".
Re Jensen, supra, note I at 516
34. Memorandum of Ainicus Curiae, at I and 4
35. ". . . the specific issue in the case (i.e. Re Ahnaas) was whether there was a
duty to join the Armed Forces and not with a total refusal to participate in any way
in an activity which would contribute directly to the prosecution of a war, such as in
the present case."
Re Jensen, supra, note I at 518
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Objection to active or passive military involvement derives from
beliefs common to all Jehovah's Witnesses: (1) that war is evil; (2)
that followers of Christ must "return good for evil"; and (3) where
God's laws conflict with the laws of man, the former are to be
obeyed. What distinguishes Re Almaas is not the appellants'
theological position which was identical, but the treatment of that
position by two respective judges.
Having distinguished Re Almaas, at least to his own satisfaction,
Addy J. then concluded that the lower court was correct in denying
the Jensens' citizenship. The ratio is expressed in the final
paragraph of his judgement:
...I am not prepared, as counsel for the appellants has invited
me to do, to declare that our law has changed to the extent that a
citizen is not obliged to faithfully contribute directly to the
prosecution of a war in which Canada may be engaged because
he objects to war on moral or religious grounds. To come to the
aid of one's country in time of war and to help bring about the
defeat of its enemies has, from the beginning of our history, been
regarded as one of the most fundamental, important and basic
duties of a subject and I am not prepared by judicial decision to
state that that duty no longer exists for I am convinced that
it does
36
and will continue to do so until changed by Parliament.
Would a grant of citizenship to the Jensens have involved
dispensing "by judicial decision" with a legal duty? No law of
Canada currently imposes the duty to which Addy J. refers, ". . . to
faithfully contribute directly to the prosecution of a war", on
anyone, citizen or non-citizen. On those very rare occasions since
1883 when such a duty has been imposed, exemption has always
been provided for conscientious religious objectors. I do not
question the authority of the State to compel military service.
Clearly it may do so. 37 But it has not done so. And when, in the
past, it has done so, it has carefully made provision for men of
conscience like Thorbum Jensen. To have granted Jensen's
citizenship would have confirmed, not changed, Canadian law; by
effectively overruling Re Almaas it was Addy J.'s judgement which
changed Canadian law and required Parliamentary action to

reverse. 38
Addy J. gave short shrift to the argument based on the Canadian
36. Id. at 520-21
37. Cf. B.N.A. Act, s.91(7)
38. CitizenshipRegulations, S.O.R. 77-127, s. 15(iv) B, discussed infra
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Bill of Rights. 39 Section 1 of that statute -

proclamation, so deracinated in interpretation -

so fulsome in

declares that

"There have existed and shall continue to exist .

.

."

certain

fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion; section 2 then
directs Courts to so construe and apply federal laws (like the
Citizenship Act) as not to ".

. .

abrogate, abridge or infringe" these

fundamental freedoms. Given this direction from a statute which
the Chief Justice of Canada recently characterized as
"quasi-constitutional"40; given the prior decision of the Citizenship
Appeal Court in Re Almaas; given that no law of Canada requires
military service; and given that both the Citizenship Act and the
Oath of Allegiance are silent about military obligations, it would
hardly have required a flight of judicial innovation to grant Mr. and
Mrs. Jensen citizenship.
It is important to re-emphasize that the Jensens were prepared, at
all times, to swear the Oath of Allegiance. But Addy J. held that the
Oath's statement "I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada" was
clearly intended to include all of the laws and all of the duties
both present andfuture".41 It is submitted that this interpretation is
both erroneous and dangerous. Erroneous, because only present
laws and duties are enforceable. One cannot commit a future crime
or tort, nor can one assume a future commitment, the terms of
which are undefined. One may have assumed a duty in the past; one
may assume a duty now; but one cannot "assume" a future duty.
Surely the Oath's reference to "duties" and "laws of Canada"
means duties and laws now existing, not those which may exist at
some speculative, unknowable future date. Dangerous, because if
Addy J. is correct, all conscientious applicants of any religion, or
indeed of no religion, might be refused citizenship based on
speculation as to what future laws may require. Who, for example,
having in mind the sordid experience of Nazi euthanisia laws,
would be prepared to swear unconditional future obedience to
domestic law sight unseen?
39. ".

.

. the common law does not grant nor does the Canadian Bill of Rights

give to any citizen the right to invoke his own interpretation of the will of God, or
of any of His precepts, as a valid motive for avoiding the duties of a citizen as they
are defined and imposed by the State and it matters not whether the interpretation
originates from the individual himself or from the precepts of a recognized
religion."
Re Jensen, supra, note 1 at 519
40. R. V.Hogan (1975),48 D.L.R. (3d) 427 at443
41. Re Jensen, supra, note 1 at 520; emphasis added.
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The essential confusion of this judgement is nicely summed up in
one line; Addy J. states: "As to the suitability of the applicants in
time of peace, I entertain not the slightest doubt. .. 42 What is one
to make of this? Are we presently at war?
It is also respectfully submitted that Addy J.'s judgment ignored
existing realities and past practice. The existing reality is that
Thorburn Jensen was 46 years old; his wife was 43. Is it likely that
they will be required by the government of Canada to commence
military service in the foreseeable future? The past practice is the
laudable initiative of the Canadian government in providing
exemption for conscientious objectors. In the unhappy event that
Canada should again become embroiled in war, is there any reason
to believe that the government would be less solicitous of preserving
religious liberty than it has been in the past? And is it not passing
strange that Thorburn Jensen was denied citizenship for a refusal to
bear arms at a time when the willingness of citizens to bear, and
use, arms, especially handguns, has prompted government to
introduce gun control legislation?
Had Addy J's judgement been the last word on this question it
would have demonstrated how little we have learned since Oliver
Wendell Holmes half a century ago wrote these words:
I had not supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to
expel them [i.e. Quakers] because they believe more than some
of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount. 43
Fortunately, the story has a somewhat happier ending. Section
31 (5) of the Citizenship Act made Addy J's judgement ".

and conclusive".

. final

Judicial review was precluded because the

Citizenship Appeal Court is, by statute 4 4, ".. . a superior Court of
record" and therefore not a ". . . federal board, commission or

other tribunal" within the meaning of section 28 of the Federal
CourtAct. On Mr. Jensen's behalf representations were made to the
Secretary of State, the Minister responsible for citizenship, which
resulted in a new section being added to the citizenship regulations
designed to preclude such a result in future. 45 The regulations
establish criteria to assist a judge to more precisely determine
whether or not an applicant

"...

has an adequate knowledge of

42. Id. at 515
43. U.S. v. Schwinner, supra, note 24 at 655
44. CitizenshipAct, supra, note 19 at s. 31 (2)
45. A new Citizenship Act was proclaimed in force on February 15, 1977. S.C.
74-75-76, c. 108; cf. CitizenshipRegulations, supra, note 38
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Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship". 46
But the section now specifically precludes questions "where the
person is a conscientious objector by reason of his religion, [of] his
obligation to Canada during time of war". 47
Mr. and Mrs. Jensen are eligible to re-apply for citizenship, and
these new regulations probably ensure that citizenship will be
granted this time. It is more difficult to explain why, after four years
of waiting and fruitless litigation, they should want to commence
the process afresh. Also it is disappointing that one of the last, if not
the very last, citizenship judgement under the old Act should have
been so illiberal, confused and myopic. As one who acquired by
birth that citizenship which the Jensens so deservedly claimed, I
cannot but feel that the Court's decision cheapened my own
citizenship.
I do not contend that it is easy to reconcile the claim of the
individual to religious liberty with the claim of the State to national
security. Conscientious objection poses intriguing jurisprudential
questions, but the exigencies of war may require that speculation
yield to fighting. I understand that. But in time of peace, one hopes
for a reflective, less jingoistic analysis of the State's tolerance of
conscientious objection.
When Christ replied to the Pharisees' trick question about man's
loyalities: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are
Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's" 48 it was a
splendid example of His wisdom. In addition to being witty and
ironic, r6partee at its best, Christ's answer did not attempt to blur
the distinction between Caesar's claims and God's. Instead it
acknowledges man's dual loyalty, but requires each person, in his
own time, to discern and strike an appropriate balance between
these conflicting obligations.
Thorburn Jensen, and a minority of conscientious objectors like
him, strike a balance which precludes active or passive military
involvement. Because this is a minority choice does not ipso facto
make it a foolish choice or an illegal choice. When the American
courts confirmed the denial of citizenship to a conscientious
objector, Holmes J. dissented:
...
if there is any principle of the Constitution that more
46. Id. ats.15
47. Id. ats.15 (IV) B
48. Mark, 12:17
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imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle
of free thought, not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate. I think that we should
adhere to that principle with
regard to admission into, as well as
49
to life within this country.
49. U.S. v. Schwimmer, supra, note 24 at 654-5

